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Burma is a nation in crisis. The country faces severe eco-nomic stagnation, endemic poverty, and serious healthand social welfare challenges, all within a context of
significant international isolation. Burma’s status as an inter-
national pariah represents a global response to a history of
gross human rights violations as well as the refusal of the State
Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the ruling military
regime, to recognize the overwhelming victory of the National
League of Democracy (NLD) in the 1990 elections. It is dif-
ficult to imagine how Burma can respond to its current cri-
sis without addressing its global political isolation, a process
that will almost certainly require a political transition from
authoritarian rule to a constitutionally based electoral democ-
racy. In this sense, the question facing Burma is not so much
whether there needs to be a democratic transition, but
rather how this transition will be managed, and when it will
take place.
One of the most important and contentious issues of a pos-
sible Burmese political transition involves how the larger soci-
ety should respond to the military regime’s legacy of human
rights violations. Attempts to face past political violence are
often presented as a binary opposition of “prosecute and pun-
ish versus forgive and forget.” This perspective creates an
impasse with democracy and human rights activists claiming
the first option, and the SPDC advocating the second. 
Understanding Burma’s future as a choice between crim-
inal prosecutions or a general amnesty fundamentally mis-
reads contemporary ideas on transitional justice as well as the
current demands of a world increasingly committed to the
internationalization of justice. Such a position is likely to
increase tension between the negotiating parties, delay a pos-
sible transition, and ultimately produce results different
from those intended by any of the parties. Conversely, a
willingness on the part of the Burmese military to accept
responsibility for past violations of basic human rights may
well provide the parties with more long-term protection
than a negotiated general amnesty. In order to move beyond
this tension, strategies for enabling a political change in
Burma should be evaluated in relation to their ability to
confer legitimacy on the transitional process, particularly as
regards a reckoning with the nation’s legacy of violations of
human rights. 
Burma’s Crisis and the Necessity of a Democratic Transition
Burma’s current crisis involves profound and systematic
dysfunction as a result of decades of governmental mis-
management. In this sense, Burma’s crisis is a political prob-
lem expressing the negative impact of authoritarianism on
every sector of society.
The SPDC is highly repressive. Gross violations of human
rights are common, including disappearances, extrajudicial
killings, torture, and rape, particularly in rural areas domi-
nated by ethnic minorities. The military government engages
in widespread forced labor as evidenced by recent Interna-
tional Labor Organization investigations. The regime detains
and imprisons citizens at will, targeting virtually anyone
whose activities are perceived to be even remotely expressive
of political dissent. The SPDC also engages in widespread sur-
veillance, censors all published material, and generally pre-
vents citizens from gaining legal access to outside informa-
tion. There is no independent judiciary in Burma and no
meaningful rule of law.
Economically, Burma is in a very difficult situation. Despite
its exceptional natural wealth, the nation’s per capita income
is only U.S.$300 per year. The nation’s infrastructure is
crumbling, living standards are poor, and attempts to stim-
ulate foreign investment have been largely unsuccessful. 
Socially, Burma suffers from endemic poverty within a
repressive system that offers residents precious few oppor-
tunities. The government’s policies have severely impacted
the educational system, leaving the country with a serious lack
of trained professionals necessary for sustained develop-
ment. In addition, Burma is deeply divided along ethnic
lines and faces several armed ethnic resistance movements.
Burma’s crisis is profoundly exacerbated by the nation’s
international isolation such that it is difficult to imagine
how the nation can address its political, economic, and
social crisis without reintegrating itself within the larger
world system. By ending its isolation, Burma will be able to
gain access to foreign investment and international aid,
including loans, financial assistance, training, infrastruc-
ture projects, and other mechanisms designed to encourage
national development. It is nonetheless highly unlikely that
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Burma can move beyond its current pariah status without
engaging in a democratic transition. 
Although it is probably too early to know whether the
nation’s transitional process has begun, important negotia-
tions have taken place between the SPDC and Aung San Suu
Kyi, the NLD General Secretary and recipient of the 1991
Nobel Peace Prize. The subject of these negotiations remains
secret, yet the establishment of communication, under-
standing, and some level of trust between the military regime
and the democracy movement is the first step toward a nego-
tiated political transition. For this reason, it is an especially
important time for those interested in Burma’s future to learn
from the transitional experiences of other nations with a keen
sensitivity to the contemporary
global political climate. 
Transitional Justice and State
Legitimacy
From the 1970s through the
1990s, dozens of countries around
the world shifted from authoritar-
ian to democratic rule, defining
such political change as a key ele-
ment of late 20th century politics.
Because authoritarian regimes are
characterized by systematic violations of fundamental human
rights, democratic transitions often involve the special chal-
lenge of responding to past political violence. The theoret-
ical and practical considerations of these issues define the
emerging interdisciplinary field of transitional justice. 
The justice issues raised in transitional societies are of a
special nature because they are directly linked to larger soci-
etal processes of political change that define the character
of the new regime. Authoritarian states’ reliance on sys-
temic political violence often calls into question the legiti-
macy of such regimes, providing important intellectual and
political support for political change. Similarly, new demo-
cratic regimes have an obligation to address the moral, polit-
ical, and legal demands of victims as a means of distin-
guishing themselves from the past government and
grounding their vision of democracy in a fundamental
respect for basic rights and rule of law.
Nevertheless, most transitions are negotiated processes
involving parties advocating democratic rule as well as rep-
resentatives of the authoritarian regime, who are often the
same individuals (or members of the same organizations)
responsible for past political violence. As such, determining
the most appropriate response to past violence is a complex
challenge, particularly when authoritarian leaders retain
significant power during the transitional process. On the one
hand, the new regime is compelled to respect the claims of
victims of political violence by adhering to basic rule of law
principles and as an expression of a commitment to pro-
tecting fundamental human rights. On the other hand, the
new regime must ensure that the transitional process is sta-
ble, peaceful, and long-lasting, which may involve an agree-
ment to limit legal responsibility for past political violence.
A successfully negotiated transition typically involves bal-
ancing the demand for justice with the practical need to pla-
cate powerful representatives of the departing authoritarian
regime. 
When the literature on democratic transitions first emerged,
discussions of these issues were often presented as a choice
between “prosecute and punish versus forgive and forget.” It
quickly became clear that this binary distinction was inadequate
for documenting the complex experiences of different coun-
tries or accounting for the multiplicity of distinct strategies for
dealing with the challenges of facing past political violence.
To a large degree, the emergence of the transitional justice
field is the result of a growing recognition of the inherent com-
plexity of responding to political violence while simultaneously
developing subtle, engaged, and context-specific responses to
these issues. It is now common to consider political transitions
as involving an array of possible strategies and policy options,
including: truth commissions, monetary reparations, apologies,
mechanisms of restorative justice, economic investment, mon-
uments and memorialization, psy-
cho-social healing, the opening of
security archives, and other means
of facing past violence in order to
build the foundations of a new
democratic order. 
Although not always under-
stood in this manner, democratic
transitions and the related field
of transitional justice are funda-
mentally concerned with the issue
of state legitimacy. For a transi-
tion to be successful, both the process and the resulting
democratic state must be understood to be legitimate in
both domestic and international spheres. As the ideas and
mechanism of transitional justice become more widespread,
they become increasingly institutionalized as mechanisms of
legitimizing a shift from authoritarian to democratic rule. In
this way, transitional societies are obligated to use the lan-
guage and policies of transitional justice as a means of ensur-
ing that their nations’ transitions are accepted, particularly
within the international community.
The Internationalization of Justice—Two Perspectives
Developing alongside the institutionalization of transi-
tional justice strategies for legitimizing democratic transi-
tions is a growing interest in the internationalization of crim-
inal justice for perpetrators of human rights violations. This
interest has grown considerably over the last decade. This
trend is evidenced by the movement to establish an Interna-
tional Criminal Court, the creation of ad hoc international
criminal tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia,
and the increasing use of domestic courts to bring criminal
and civil cases against individuals accused of gross violations
of human rights. All of these activities are linked to one of the
most basic principles of international law: the idea that one
cannot engage in an international criminal case without first
exhausting domestic remedies. Both the widespread use of
transitional justice strategies and the recent increase in inter-
national prosecutions are expressions of a general global con-
sensus to deny states the possibility of failing to face their
legacies of gross violations of human rights. As such, the inter-
national cases arising out of democratic transitions typically
express the measured determination of an essential failure
within the transitional process. 
To help make sense of the interrelationship between
these two global trends and their link to a future Burmese
continued on next page
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transition, it is useful to compare the arrest and detention
of General Augusto Pinochet, the former autocratic leader
of Chile’s military dictatorship, with the international com-
munity’s response to South Africa’s transitional experience.
The “Pinochet Precedent”
From late 1998 through early 2000, Gen-
eral Pinochet was detained in London
pending possible extradition to Spain to
face charges of terrorism, genocide,
and other gross violations of human
rights. The case became one of the
most widely discussed legal issues of
the century’s end, representing the
first time that a nation’s domestic
court was used successfully to enforce
internationally recognized human
rights principles against a former
head of state for crimes committed in
a different country. Although Pinochet
was eventually released for medical rea-
sons, the Spanish high court affirmed
the legality of the case and the British
high court ruled that the ex-dictator could
be extradited, defining what is sometimes
referred to as the “Pinochet precedent.” The
case is of great legal significance because it
affirmed the principle of universal jurisdiction
for prosecuting alleged perpetrators of human
rights violations, negated the legal protection
of general amnesties provided to former perpetrators
in the Spanish cases, and denied the protection of sovereign
and head of state immunity for former leaders in the British
cases. 
The widespread international support for the case defines
an emerging international commitment to taking legal
action against the institutionalized impunity that has long pro-
tected former leaders of brutal regimes. To a large degree,
the broad international support for the case expresses a
general criticism of the Chilean transition as illegitimate
because it provided a broad amnesty to General Pinochet and
the military government he controlled. In this respect, the
“Pinochet precedent” is a warning for authoritarian leaders,
both in and out of power, who have engineered similar
mechanisms of domestic legal protection. 
The Amnesty Process of the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission
The South African case presents a different situation in
which the international community has largely supported a
negotiated transition that provided perpetrators with a lim-
ited amnesty for their legal responsibility for gross viola-
tions of human rights. This approach is especially significant
considering South Africa’s status as an international pariah
during the apartheid era. 
The transition from a racially based minority rule to a
democratically elected government was a complex process
involving lengthy negotiations, the drafting of a new con-
stitution, the first free and fair general elections in the
nation’s history, massive investment to address basic social
needs, and significant legislative changes. The negotiations
also involved the decision to form the Truth and Reconcil-
iation Commission (TRC) to deal with key elements of tran-
sitional justice. 
The mission of the TRC was to assist the nation in facing
its legacy of gross violations of human rights. To accom-
plish its mandate, the Commission was divided into three
committees: a human rights committee that gathered and
analyzed data and testimony on political violence and held
numerous public hearings; a reparations committee that
considered how to provide victims with financial assis-
tance; and an amnesty committee that allowed per-
petrators to receive full civil and criminal protec-
tion for particular crimes. Perpetrators could
receive amnesty only if their crimes were of a
political nature and they were willing to tell the
full truth about the events in question. For
some, the idea of providing amnesty to per-
petrators who confessed was highly immoral,
while for others the strategy represented
an important means of revealing the shad-
owy violence that defined the apartheid
state as part of a larger process of national
reconciliation. 
The international community generally
views the TRC positively and considers South
Africa to be a prime example of a legitimate
political transition. It is thus highly unlikely
that a foreign nation would be willing or capa-
ble of prosecuting those South African per-
petrators granted amnesty through the TRC
process. First, a careful review of the legality
of the domestic process would probably show
that the nation adequately engaged in rea-
sonable rule of law procedures regarding
the crimes for which particular perpetrators
received amnesty. Almost every aspect of
the policies enacted was carefully designed
with broad domestic and international con-
sultations, and premised upon a basic com-
mitment to rule of law with an understanding
of the special challenges of a democratic transition. 
Second, criminally prosecuting an individual pro-
vided with amnesty through the TRC would represent a
basic challenge to the legality of South Africa’s transitional
policies. If a court of one nation questioned the validity of
a South African amnesty (as numerous European courts
were willing to do in the Pinochet case), the act would stand
as a political judgment that the TRC and the larger transi-
tional process was fundamentally illegitimate. Because the
transitional process generally has been understood to have
been highly legitimate, South African perpetrators whose
amnesty petitions were approved by the TRC (though not
those denied amnesty or those who never sought amnesty)
are likely to benefit from a general protection against inter-
national prosecution. 
For democratic transitions to be considered legitimate,
they must appear to be genuinely engaged in a serious reck-
oning with past human rights violations. This is particularly true
for nations such as Burma, which are isolated and display a rel-
atively weak international status. To avoid the global consen-
sus of illegitimacy regarding Chile’s general amnesty (that led
to subsequent international prosecutions) and to achieve the
continued on next page
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to serve all of the community equally. The nationalist polit-
ical parties retaliated to the weakening of Patten’s propos-
als by refusing to take their seats on the new Policing Board.
In their August 2001 package of proposals for the imple-
mentation of the Good Friday Agreement, the British and
Irish governments undertook to publish a revised Imple-
mentation Plan for policing reform, which has persuaded one
of the nationalist parties, the Social Democratic and Labor
Party, to take up its seats on the Policing Board. 
Among others, the U.S. Congress is concerned about the
failure to implement properly the Patten recommendations.
Other groups, such as British Irish RIGHTS WATCH, view the
greatest concern about policing in Northern Ireland as Pat-
ten’s refusal to address the question of how to root out those
who were serial human rights abusers under the old system.
Policing will change in Northern Ireland only if Catholic
nationalists are sufficiently confident to join and remain in the
new police service in numbers. This is unlikely to happen while
RUC officers who used violence, lies, and collusion as their daily
working methods are allowed to remain in place, without
ever being brought to justice and without having to take the
new oath. Unless Catholics can be persuaded to join and
remain in the new police service, the rule of law will continue
to be problematic in Northern Ireland.
Conclusion
Many argue that Northern Ireland needs a truth and rec-
onciliation commission to deal with its past human rights
abuses, but the possibility of Northern Ireland’s establishing
a truth commission is highly unlikely. Truth commissions
have tended to be established in states in which regimes
have changed and the incoming governments have been pre-
pared to allow investigators to subject the former govern-
ment’s activities to scrutiny. Such conditions do not exist in
Northern Ireland, and resistance to any development on the
part of the “securocrats,” i.e., intelligence services and oth-
ers who are responsible for state security, is likely to ensure
that a truth commission never develops. Without a truth
commission, there will be continued domestic and interna-
tional pressure for costly public inquiries that may go on for
years and possibly hinder the peace process itself.
In hindsight, the human rights provisions of the Good Fri-
day Agreement have been more well-intentioned than well-
implemented. The Agreement offers a unique opportunity
to consider the human rights deficit in Northern Ireland
holistically. British Irish RIGHTS WATCH and other NGOs
advocated for the wholesale reform of the system of crimi-
nal justice, looking at the issues of policing, emergency laws
and the system itself as arms of a single entity. Instead, the
government has allowed the criminal justice system to be
reviewed piecemeal, resulting in an incoherent strategy that
will not ensure the integrated and radical reforms that are
essential to the development of stability and peace in North-
ern Ireland. The conflict is by no means over. According to
British Irish RIGHTS WATCH’s calculations, over 170 people
have died since the 1994 cease-fires. The fear for most is that
missing the opportunity for more coherent human rights
reforms in Northern Ireland, together with the absence of
any effective mechanism for dealing with past abuses, may
one day be seen as having been a fatal error. 
* Jane Winter is the Director of British Irish RIGHTS WATCH and a
former Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies at
the University of London. Natasha Parassram Concepcion is a J.D.
candidate at the Washington College of Law and co-editor-in-chief of
the Human Rights Brief.
legitimacy of South Africa’s partial amnesty (that will likely pro-
tect perpetrators from international prosecution), Burma’s
future democratic transition will require a formal reckoning
with responsibility for past human rights violations. 
Conclusion
Burma has much to gain from formally engaging with the
ideas and policy options of transitional justice as a means of
ensuring the legitimacy of future political change. To grasp
the significance of these issues, it is important to consider that
transitional justice in both theory and practice is structured
by two basic principles: first, a recognition that each nation’s
transitional experience is unique and molded by distinct
social, cultural, and historical factors; and second, that there
are basic moral understandings, legal principles, and logisti-
cal issues common to all democratic transitions. By formally
acknowledging the second principle—evoking the language
of transitional justice, seeking to learn from the experiences
of other nations, and openly accepting basic international
human rights standards—Burma may well increase the inter-
national community’s willingness to respect the first princi-
ple— Burma’s need to find its own solutions to its problems. 
By addressing its violent past, Burma can ensure that a
future transition is accepted at an international level while
retaining a relatively high degree of autonomy regarding spe-
cific policy decisions. In negotiating its future political tran-
sition, Burma need not engage in full-scale prosecutions
and may or may not choose to grant some form of amnesty
to past perpetrators. To achieve the international legitimacy
necessary for a successful transition, however, Burma must
formally reckon with its legacy of gross violations of human
rights and the related questions of responsibility. 
* Daniel Rothenberg is Assistant Professor of Anthropology at the
University of Michigan; Fellow, Michigan Society of Fellows. 
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